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Linchey: Wrongful Life

NOTES
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
"WRONGFUL LIFE" IN
CALIFORNIA: BREECH
BIRTH OR
ABORTION?
1. INTRODUCTION

Medical advances during the last fifteen years in the fields
of genetic testing and prenatal diagnosis of fetal defects have
created a new plaintiff. This plaintiff's cause of action, termed
"wrongful life," alleges that the defendant's negligence caused
her l birth and thereby made manifest the pain and suffering of
her genetic defects.
Most American courts have denied the infant plaintiff access to the courts by holding that she has not suffered any injury
assessable under Aniericantort law. Within the California Court
of Appeal, two districts have recently arrived at opposite conclusions, and the issue is being reviewed by the California Supreme
Court.1 In Curlencler v. Bio-Science Laboratories' the California
Court of Appeal for the Second District reviewed and rejected
arguments advanced in major cases from other jurisdictions
which refuse to recognize plaintiff's purported cause of action.
Holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action,
Curlender developed a new theory of recovery. One year later,
1. The plaintiffs in the two major wrongful life cases reviewed in this Note happened to be female. as are the majority of plaintiffs mentioned herein. Therefore, the
feminine gender will be used when referring generally to a wrongful life plaintiff. However. in this context. the feminine includes the masculine.
2. Turpin v. Bortini. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690.174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), rev'd (May 3,
1982) (No. S.F. 24319). See editor's note at the end of this Note.
3. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2nd Dist. 1980).
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the California Court of Appeal for the fifth District decided Turpin u. Sortini, 4 rejecting the Curlender analysis and refusing to
recognize the plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful life.
In so doing, the Turpin majority failed to recognize the import of the Curlender decision, dismissed its reasoning as "narrow, humanistic,"!! "without analysis,'" "unsound,'" "unwise'"
and "conclusional,"9 and thereby failed to address and explain
its conclusion that Curlender's ground breaking holding, unique
reasoning, and policy bases were unjustified and unworkable
within modern tort law.
After tracing the history of the major wrongful life cases in
this country, this Note will assess the conflict between Turpin
and Curlender and show why Curlender's unique reasoing conforms to modern tort law and compels recognition of a child's
cause of action for wrongful life.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

OVERVIEW

Zepeda u. Zepeda lo was the first wrongful life case in this
country. Joseph Zepeda, born an illegitimate child, brought suit
against his father, Louis Zepeda. l1 The court found that the
plaintiff's complaint contained all the elements of a willful tortl l
and it also stated that an illegitimate child suffers an injury, but
it refused to allow the plaintiff's cause of action. I I The court said
that the plaintiff protested his very birth and .thus called this
new tort "wrongful life. III. The court believed that under this
4. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (6th Dist. 1981), rev'd (May 3, 1982) (No.
S.F. 24319).
6. rd. at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
6. ld. at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
7. ld. at 692, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
8. ld. at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
9. ld. at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
10. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
11. In Zepeda, the plaintiff alleged that his illegitimate status was due to his father's actions in inducing his mother to engage in sexual relations. The inducement was a
promise of marriage. However, the defendant was already married and, though the plaintiff was conceived and born, the promise was not kept. ld. at 245, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
12. ld. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
13. [d. at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
14. ld. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
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new theory of wrongful life, any unliked physical characteristic,
including a hereditary disease, would be actionable. I I The main
concern of the court was not the flood of litigation that might
result from suits by illegitimates, but rather the multifarious circumstances and physical characteristics that might constitute an
injury and therefore be actionable under a wrongful life theory.11
If this new cause of action was to be accepted, the court thought
that it should be declared by the legislature. I '
In Williams v. State,18 the New York Court of Appeals also
faced a plaintiff who claimed injury due to her illegitimacy. The
suit was brought not against her father, however, but against the
state mental institution where her mother had been confined.I t
The Williams' court could find no basis for ruling that an illegitimate child has suffered an injury recognized by law. tO Focusing
on the circumstantial nature of the claimed injury, the court
stated that, "being bom under one set of circumstances rather
than another or to one pair of parents rather than another is not
a suable wrong that is cognizable in court. "II

In a concurring opinion, Judge Keating expressed what, for
later courts, would become the main impediment to recognition
of a wrongful life cause of·action:
Damages are awarded in tort cases on the basis of
a comparison between the position the plaintiff
would have been in, had the defendant not committed the acts causing injury, and the position in
which the plaintift' presently finds herself. The
damages sought by the plaintiff in the case at bar
involve a determination as to whether non-existence or nonlife is preferable to life as an illegiti15. Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
16.1d.
17. Id. at 263, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
18. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
19. Plaintiff Christine Williams was conceived when her mother was raped by an
unidentified assailant while she was confined as a patient in a New York mental facility.
The child alleged that the state was negligent in its care, custody and supervision of her
mother and in failing to protect her from physical attacks. The plaintiff claimed injuries
from illegitimacy and deprivation of a normal childhood, including deprivation of proper
care, support and rearing because her mother was mentally deficient. The court, however, addressed illegitimacy as the main injury. Id. at 482, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
20.1d.
21. Id. at 484, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 4

426

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:423

mate with all the hardship attendant thereon. It
is impossible to make that choice. I I

Both the belief that the child's cause of action required a
valuation of nonexistence against life and a judicial reluctance to
make or even allow to be made such a determination recur in all
the later cases, except Curlender.
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove a8 the New Jersey Supreme Court
became the first court to address a wrongful life suit where the
injuries were birth defects with pain and suffering and the negligence alleged was medical malpractice. l • Sandra Gleitman entered the care of defendant Dr. Cosgrove when she was two
months pregnant. A month earlier she had had German measles.
Mrs. Gleitman testified that Dr. Cosgrove advised her that the
measles would have no effect on her child. Allegedly, this opinion was repeated to Ms. Gleitman at a later date by the other
defendant, also a doctor. III Subsequently, she gave birth to a
baby boy, plaintiff Jeffrey Gleitman, born deaf, mute, almost
blind and mentally retarded. Ie The parents alleged that had
they been informed of the possibility of the defective birth, Mrs.
Gleitman would have undergone an abortion."
The court stated that in tort law, compensatory damages
are measured by the difference between the plaintiff's impaired
state and the state the plaintiff would have been in absent the
defendant's negligence.lIS Here, the infant plaintiff never would
have existed since, absent the negligence, the parents would
have aborted the fetus. le
22. Id. at 484-85, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
23. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
24. Besides the child plaintift"saction for wrongful life, his parents brought "wrongful birth" actions on their own behalf for the injuries to themselves arising from the
birth and life of their son. Id. at 23, 227 A.2d at 690.
25. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
26. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 703.
27. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. In rebuttal, Dr. Cosgrove testified that he did inform
Mrs. Gleitman of the possible effects of her measles on the fetus. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at
690. The parents sought damages for their own mental and emotional suffering and for
the expense of raising the child; the child sought to recover for his own pain and suffering due to the birth defects. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
28. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. The court stated, "the infant plaintiff would have us
measure the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determination." Id.
29. "[Tlhe conduct complained of, even if true, does not give rise to damages cogni-
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In the years following Gleitman, other state courts began to
recognize the parents' cause of action for wrongful birth while at
the same time continuing to deny the child's wrongful life cause
of action. so Recognition of the parents' cause of action was sometimes facilitated by the U.S. Supreme Court's abortion decision
of Roe v. Wade,81 since a woman's constitutional right to an
abortion during the first trimester supports the parents' right to
choose to abort a genetically defective fetus. Abortion is not alzable at law." Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692. In also denying the parent's cause of action, the
court found that it was impossible to weigh the benefit of the child against the parent's
emotional and monetary damages. "Such a proposed weighing is similar to what which
we have found impossible to perform for the infant plaintiff." Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
30. See Gidner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Stewart v. Long Island Col"
lege Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), modified 35 A.D.2d
531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd as modified, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975). For commentaries on the wrongful life subject see Capron, Informed Decisionmaking In Genetic Counseling: A Dissent To the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J.
581 (1972-73); Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 UNIV. or PA. L. REv.
92 (1974); Kashi, The Case of The Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1409 (1977); Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 919 (1979); Ploscowe, An Action for "Wrongful Life", 38 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1078 (1963); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1401; Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REv. 513 (1966);
Note, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right To Be Healthy: Park v. Chessin; Becker
v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537 (1978); Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful
Birth Causes of Action-Suggestions For a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 611
(1980); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 58 (1970); Note, Preconception Tort-The Need for a Limitation, 44 Mo. L. REV.
143 (1979); Note, Torts- Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REV. 167 (1979);
Note, Torts Prior To Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REV. 706
(1977); Comment, Howard v. Lecher: An Unreasonable Limitation on a Physician's Liability in a Wrongful Life Suit, 12 NEW ENG. L. REv. 819 (1977); Comment, Wrongful
Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140 (1976); Note,
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: Filling The Wrongful Life Vacuum, 9 SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REv. 113 (1981); Note, New Jersey Recognizes Parents Cause of Action for Emotional Damages for Wrongful Birth But Denies Infant's Cause of Action
for Wrongful Life, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 176 (1980); Note, Torts- Wrongful Life-Infant's
Right To Sue For Negligent Genetic Counseling, 48 TENN. L. REV. 493 (1981); Comment, Preconception Torts: A New Look at Our Newest Class of Litigants, 10 TEx.
TECH. L. REV. 97 (1978); Comment, Liability For Wrongfully Causing One To Be Born:
Development of a Tort For "Wrongful Life", 10 U.W.L.A. L. REv. 53 (1978); Note,
Torts-An Action for Wrongful Life Brought on Behalf of the Wrongfully Conceived
Infant, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 712 (1977); Note, Torts- Wrongful Life-No Cause of
Action for Failure to Inform Of Possible Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 750 (1967);
Note Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1978).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ways an issue in a wrongful life or wrongful birth case, however.
As later cases reveal, developments in genetic testing provide a
method of determining the possibility of genetic defects even
prior to conception. 32 Coupled with modern methods of contraception, this affords parents the choice not to conceive a child
who would face life with severe physical or mental defects.
In a case of first impression in New York, the appeals court
in Park v. Chessin 38 rejected the arguments from other jurisdictions and took the unprecedented step of recognizing the child's
cause of action for wrongfullife. 84 It found that New York's abolition of its abortion ban gave parents the right not to have a
child. I I Then, without citing authority or providing much analysis, the court stated that, "[T]he breach of this right may also be
said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born
as a whole, functional human being...ae
The court held that the infant plaintiff stated a cause of
action for wrongful life and allowed recovery for the child's injuries and conscious pain and suffering. a7 Though the Park court's
holding was to be short-lived, it was the initial judicial attempt
to· provide a framework for recognition of a wrongful life cause
of action.
In a companion case, Becker v. Swartz,a. the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the Park decision, at holding that the
32. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counselins, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618
(1979).
33. 60 A.D.2d 30, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
34. Steven and Hetty Park sued on behalf of themselves and their child, Sara Park.
Hetty had previously given birth to a child with fatal polycystic kidney disease who sur·
vived only five hours. Because this disease is hereditary, there was a substantial
probability that any subsequent child would likewise be afflicted. The parents alleged
that prior to conceiving a second child they consulted the defendant doctors who alleg·
edly stated that the disease was not hereditary and the the chances of these parents
producing another child with the diseases were "practically nil." The parents then con·
ceived their second child, plaintiff Sara Park, who was also born with polyeystic kidney
disease and died from it at the age of two·and·a·half. Id. at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
35. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
36.Id.
37. [d. A concurring justice noted that "the action on behalf of the deceased infant
is not for 'wrongful life', but rather for conscious pain and Buffering allegedly caused by
the negligence of the defendant doctors." Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
38. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
39. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 30, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
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child, Sara Park, failed to state a cause of action. The court
based its holding on two closely related concepts. First, the
plaintiff had not suffered a legally cognizable injury. Philosophers and theologians, the court reasoned, not judges, are
equipped to decide "[w)hether it is better never to have been
born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies. "40 The court found "no predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child."41 Second, assessing
compensatory damages requires a measurement of nonexistence
(the. state the child would have been in absent the negligence),
against life with defects (the state the child is in due to the defendant's negligence). The court found it impossible to make
this measurement. 41 Both these concepts are founded on the
court's refusal to assess, or allow a jury to assess, the value of
nonexistence or of life. U In the end, the court decided that legislative, rather than judicial, action was required for recognition of
this novel cause of action. 44
The theoretical problems that courts have faced in dealing
with plaintiffs who claim injury due to birth with physical ab40. 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
41. Id.
42. "Simply put, a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery
for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependant upon a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence. This comparison, the law is not eqoipped to make." Id. at 442, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
43. The court also rejected the appellate court's new found right to be born whole:
"There is no precedent for recognition at the Appellate Division of 'the fundamental
right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being.''' Id. at 411,413 N.Y.S.2d
at 900 (citations omitted).
44. Id., at 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901. The court then allowed the parents' cause of
action for wrongful birth, but limited the recoverable damages to the monetary expenses
of care and treatment until the child's death. Id. at 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903. For policy
reasons, the court declined to allow damages for the parents' mental and emotional swfering. The court cited REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 920 which states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to
the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a
special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed,
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation
of damages to the extent that this is equitable.
Noting that the parents' damages for mental and emotional suffering would be mitigated
by the emotional rewards of parenthood, the court found the calculation of these damages too speculative. The court again deferred allowance of these damages to the legislature. Id. at 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
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normalities are shown in Elliott v. Brown,'" an Alabama Supreme Court case decided four months prior to Becker. The Elliott case depicts a claim which, unlike Gleitman or Park, aptly
deserves the label "wrongful life." In Elliott, the husband underwent a vasectomy because of fears for the wife's health if she
had to go through a pregnancy. Thereafter, Rachael Elliott was
conceived and later born with serious deformities.·'
The infant plaintiff alleged that the vasectomy had been
performed negligently." The court reviewed earlier cases, including Gleitman and Park, and found that the denial of a cause
of action for wrongful life is based on the impossibility of calculating damages. 48 Raising and disposing of this claim,·' the court
held there is no legal right to be born as a whole, functional
human being. lo On these bases the court denied the child's cause
of action.
However, Elliott is distinguishable from wrongful life cases
faced by other courts. In Elliott, the plaintiff did riot allege that
the "defendant knew or should have known that, if born, she
would have a deformity."ll Thus, the defendant could not have
been negligent toward the child plaintiff with respect to her pain
and suffering from the defects. In Elliott, unlike other wrongful
life cases reviewed here, the plaintiff truly claimed that the defendant's negligence simply consisted of allowing her to be conceived and born. Even if a wrongful life cause of action were
recognized, the child plaintiff in Elliott would not be allowed to
recover damages for the defects, since these were an unforseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence.
In Berman v. Allanl l the New Jersey Supreme Court was
called upon to reassess Gleitman, decided twelve years earlier.
Sharon, the child plaintiff, sought damages for the physical and
emotional pain and suffering due to her mongloid condition.ls As
45. 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. S. Ct. 1978).
46. Id. at 547.
47.Id.
48.Id.
49. Id. at 548.
50.Id.
51. Id. at 547.
52. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
53. Shirley Berman, 38 years old and pregnant, entered into the care or the deren-
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in Gleitman, the Berman court denied the. child's cause of action, albeit for a different reason.
The Berman court acknowledged that Sharon would suffer
greatly.&4 Comparing her to normal, healthy children, the court
stated "she, unlike them, will experience a great deal of physical
and emotional pain and anguish."n Then the court did explicitly
what prior courts had only done implicitly: it weighed the value
of life with defects against nonexistence and came down on the
side of life in any form."
In Speck v. Finegold'" an intermediate Pennsylvania court
denied the child's wrongful life cause of action, but allowed the
parents' cause of action for wrongful birth by relying on the California case of Custodio v. Bauer." In denying the child-plaintiff
dant doctors. She later gave birth to the child plaintiff, Sharon, who was born with
Down's Syndrome-a genetic defect commonly known as mongolism. The plaintiffs,
Sharon and her parents, alleged that the defendant doctors failed to follow standard
medical practice. They alleged that because of Shirley's age and the statistically high
possibility that a child bom of a woman who is over 35 years old will have Down's Syn·
drome, the defendants should have informed her about amniocentosis, a method of de·
tecting genetic defects in a fetus. The plaintiffs further alleged that had they been 110
informed and if the defects were detected, the fetus would have been aborted. rd. at 424·
25, 404 A.2d at 10.
54. Mter cataloging the instances where society shows how precious life is, the court
noted that society also has a high regard for members of the medical profession. rd. at
429·30, 404 A.2d at 12·13.
55. rd. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
56. "Notwithstanding her afBication with Down's Syndrome, Sharon, by virtue of
her birth, will be able to love and be loved and to experience happiness and pleasure emotions which are truly the essence of life and which are far more valuable than the
Buffering she may endure." rd. Reversing part of Gleitman's holding, the Berman court
recognized the parents' claim for emotional and mental suffering. The parents' claim for
actual expenses of raising the child was denied because the court found this burden to be
more than offset by the benefit they received - the joy and love of raising the child. rd.
at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
57. 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super.) (1979).
58. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). The court also made an interest·
ing observation. The trial court had denied the parents' cause of action because the
worth and sanctity of life was so great a societal interest that allowing damages in any
form would be against public policy. The appellate court stated that "the lower court
misses the point when it bases its opinion on this premise. The question is not the worth
and sanctity of life, but whether the doctors were negligent in their surgical attempts at
vasectomy and abortion." 408 A.2d at 503. No reason is given in the opinion for why this
idea did not apply with equal force to the child's cause of action. For this court, as for
prior courts, the "worth and sanctity of life" was the main consideration for denial of the
child's cause of action.
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Francine's cause of action,'11 the court enunciated several theories, all of which had been dealt with by earlier courts. First,
there is no fundamental right to be born as a whole functional
human being. The value of nonexistence over that of life with
defects is a question for philosophers and theologians, not tort
law. 'o Second, in tort law, damages are compensatory; measuring
damages requires a comparison of non-existence with life in an
impaired state-a comparison the law cannot make.II Third, this
was not an action cognizable at law.1t While the court failed to
explain the third point, it apparently concluded that the child
has suffered no injury recognized by law because the court cannot and will not measure damages under traditional tort
principles.

B.

CALIFORNIA CASE LAW

Two California cases, decided prior to Curlender, shed light
on the issues that arise in wrongful life causes and provide conceptual tools for dealing with them. These cases also show the
state of California law on the subject when Curlender arose.
'In 1967, just two months after Gleitman refused to recognize either the parents' or child's causes of action, a California
appellate court in Custodio v. Bauer" recognized the parents'
cause of action for wrongful birth and allowed a broad range of
damages. The parents, seeking to limit the size of their family
and to protect the wife's health, employed the defendant doctors
to perform a sterilization operation upon the wife. When the
wife later became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child,
59. 408 A.2d at 509. Frank and Dorothy Speck decided they did not want any more
children. Tbey were concerned that another child would be aftlicted with neurofibro·
matosis, a crippling and disfiguring disease of the fibrous structures of the nerves. Their
fear was well founded. Frank and their daughters, Valerie and Lee Ann, were already
victims of the disease. For this reason, Mr. Speck had Dr. Finegold, one defendant, per·
form a vasectomy. Thereafter, Mrs. Speck became pregnant. Dr. Swartz, another defendant, was then engaged to perform an abortion, after which he allegedly proclaimed successful termination of the pregnancy. About four months later Francine Speck was born
prematurely and aftlicted with neurofibromatosis. 408 A.2d at 499-500.
60. 408 A.2d at 508.
6!. ld. In Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (Pa. Super.), the Supreme Court
split 3-3 on the question of whether Francine could bring a wrongful life cause of action.
This evenly divided vote operated to automatically affirm the intermediate court's determination that Francine did not have a cause of action against the defendant doctors.
62.ld.
63. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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their tenth, the parent plaintiffs alleged that the operation was
performed negligently. No cause of action was brought by the
child, presumably because the child was born healthy.
The Custodio court rejected arguments similar to those
raised by the defendants in Gleitman and held that the parents
stated a cause of action. Upon proof of negligence, damages were
allowable for the cost of the sterilization operation, mental and
physical pain, loss of the wife's society and comfort, cost of the
pregancy and delivery, and any further damages developed at
trial, including the costs of raising the child.If
The court then addressed the applicability of the benefit
rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 920." The
Custodio court noted that the rule contemplates a benefit to the
interest to be protected. ee Thus, when the defendant's negligence confers a benefit as well as a burden on the plantiff, the
defendant can offset the measure of damages with the value of
the benefit. However, this can only be done when the benefit
accrues to the plaintiff's interest that would have been protected, absent the defendant's negligence.
In this case, the sterilization had been sought to protect the
wife's health. The court then narrowly construed this interest
and stated that U[i]f the failure of the sterilization operation and
the ensuing pregnancy benefitted the wife's emotional and nervous makeup, and any infirmities in her kidney and bladder organs, the defendants should be able to offset it."·' By narrowly
construing the scope of the interest to be protected, Custodio
swiftly disposed of the defendants' benefit argument. The court
did not construe the wife's general physical and mental health as
the interest to be protected, which in certain respects may have
benefitted from the joy, love, and affection of another child. Instead, the court narrowed the scope of this interest to the particular mental and physical areas that the defendants' negligence
had endangered, namely, the wife's nervous makeup, her kidney
and bladder.
64. Id. at 322-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76.
65. For text of § 920, see note 44 supra.
66. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
67.Id.
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In Stills v. Gratton,es the second California case, the court
faced a plaintiff who claimed injury by reason of his illegitimacy.
His mother, unmarried and pregnant, had employed the defendant to perform an abortion. Though the operation was performed, the child plaintiff was later born healthy.ell Both mother
and child brought actions for damages alleging negligence by the
defendant. In upholding the mother's cause of action, the court
reiterated the Custodio analysis concerning a wrongful birth
cause of action, including the applicability of Restatement section 920.'70
The court denied the child's cause of action, cited both
Zepeda v. Zepeda and Williams v. State and noted that the
child "is a healthy, happy youngster who is a joy to his mother.
His only damage, if any, caused by the respondents' conduct is
in being born."'l
III. REASONING· IN THE PRINCIPLE TWO CASES:
CURLENDER and TURPIN
Recently, two districts of the California Court of Appeal
faced child plaintiff's alleging that had their parents known they
would give birth to a child with defects they would have chosen
not to conceive, and, had they conceived, would have aborted.
The question in both cases was whether a child living with physical defects could recover in damages for the pain and suffering
incurred when the only alternative to the child was never to
have been born at all.
The court in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories'71 held
that an infant born with Tay-Sachs disease stated a cause of action for wrongful life against the defendant laboratories which, it
was alleged, had negligently misinformed the child's parents
that they would not produce a child aftlicted with Tay-Sachs.'7I
68. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
69. Id. at 701·03, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 653·54.
70. Id. at 708·09, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 658·59 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS,
§ 920 (1979».
71. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656. The court also cited Gleitman for
the proposition that in wrongful life cases it is impossible to measure damages. 1d. at
706, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
72. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
73. In Curlender the complaint alleged 88 follows: Phillis and Hyam Curlender,
plaintiff's parents, on January 15, 1977, retained defendant medical laboratories to ad·
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One year later, the court in Turpin v. Sortini"4 reviewed all
prior case law, rejected the Cur lender holding, and instead held
that the deaf child plaintiff, Joy Turpin, had not stated a cause
of action.
A.

JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP TORT LAW

Since all prior authority had denied the wrongful life cause
of action, the Turpin court's first volley at the Curlender decision was aimed at Curlender's right to establish such a cause c:>f
action. An analysis of this part of both the Curlender and Turpin decisions requires an understanding of the California Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.'7&
In Rodriguez the Supreme Court faced a situation where sixteen
years earlier the California Supreme Court, in Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co.,'" had flatly denied a
cause of action for spousal loss of consortium."7 The Rodriguez
Court stressed that the impediment it faced to recognition of
such a cause of action was the precedential force of Deshotel. 78
In response, the Rodriguez court found that subsequent to
minister certain tests. These tests were designed to reveal whether either of the parents
were carriers of genes which would result in the conception and birth of a child with
Tay.Sachs disease, medically termed "amaurotic familial idiocy." The tests were given
on January 21, 1977 and the results allegedly showed that a child conceived of these
parents would not be afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease. Sometime later Phillis Curlender
gave birth to a baby girl, plaintiff Shauna Tamar Curlender, and on May 10, 1978,
Shauna's parents were told that Shauna had Tay·Sachs disease. Id. at 815·16, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 480.
74. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690,174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), rev'd (May 3, 1982) (SF 24319).
See editor's note at the end of this Note. In Turpin the plaintiff, Joy Turpin, alleged
that the defendants had diagnosed her elder sister, Hope Turpin, as having normal hear·
ing. In fact, Hope was totally deaf due to a hereditary hearing defect. Plaintiff's parents,
James and Joy Turpin, allegedly relied upon these diagnoses and conceived plaintiff.
Born on August 23, 1977, Joy like her sister Hope, was totally deaf from a hereditary
abnormality. Id. at 692, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
75. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). In Rodriguez the California Supreme Court was "called upon to decide whether California should continue to
adhere to the rule that a married person whose spouse has been injured by the negligence of a third party has no cause of action for loss of 'consortium', i.e. for loss of
conjugal fellowship and sexual relations." Id. at 385, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
766.
76. 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
77. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d at 387, 525 P.2d at 671,115 Cal.
Rptr. at 767.
78. Referring to the trial court, the Supreme Court stated, "Addressing Mary Anne's
counsel, the court made it clear that it would have ruled in his client's favor but for the
precedent of Deshotel . ... " Id.
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the Deshotel decision there had been a dramatic shift in the
weight of authority. Many state courts and commentators had
reversed their earlier positions and had recognized the spouse's
cause of action for loss of consortium.711 On this basis Rodriguez
held that Deshotel was no longer sound authority and overruled
it.IO

Against . this background, the Turpin court criticized
Curlender for recognizing the child's cause of action since there
had been no such shift in the weight of authority.ll The question
arises, however, whether the need for a shift in authority, called
for in Rodriguez, applies to Curlender. The Rodriguez court
faced, as its impediment, California Supreme Court precedent
which had stood for sixteen years. To test the continued validity
of its own precedent, the court looked to other jurisdictions and
to the works of legal commentators. The Rodriguez holding accomplished a change in California common law and a concomitant overruling of California precedent. For this reason, the
Court sought support for its holding in the previous shift of attitude in legal circles.
However, the Curlender court distinguished the facts in its
case from Stills v. Gratton, II the only previous wrongful life decision in California, and, therefore, did not face any longstanding California precedent. Since the child in Stills was born
healthy, the only possible injury was his illegitimacy, merely a
difference in status, and not a physical injury as in Curlender
and later in Turpin. II Turpin, though, rejected any distinguish79. rd. at 388-93, 525 P.2d at 672-75,.115 Cal. Rptr. at 768-71.
80. rd. at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
81. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 693, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. "The reasons for changing these
principles do not comport with the criteria for changing long-standing rules of law under
the standards of Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp . ... ; specifically, as will be pointed
out, there has been no dramatic shift, indeed no shift, in the weight of authority against
allowing recovery ...... rd.
82. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
83. The Curlender court stated:
"(I)llegitimacy is a status which mayor may not prove to be a
hinderance to one so born, depending on a multitude of other
facts; it cannot be disputed that in present society luch a circumstance, both socially and legally, no longer need present
an overwhelming obstacle. The same is true for the limply unwanted child. We agree with the reasoning of Zepeda and
Stills that a cause of action based upon impairment of status
- illegitimacy contrasted with legitimacy - ehould not be
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ing of Stills:
Curlender concludes that illegitimacy is not an
injury. It is, however, not a reality that despite social gains the disadvantage and stigma of being a
bastard have far from disappeared? [Citation]. It
is not specious to argue that the burden of illegitimacy is a less compensable injury than many
physical impairments or defects? Though not justified, may it not in fact be true that an unwanted
illegitimate child, even more than the cared-for
although physically handicapped child, is doomed
to a life of hardship and social stigma?'·

One might wonder whether these are truly the rhetorical
questions the Turpin court believed them to be. Furthermore,
while the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez faced its own
precedent, which had stood for sixteen years, Curlender, decided
by an appellate court from the Second District, faced Stills, an
appellate decision from the First District, which had stood for
only four years. u Thus, the Rodriguez factors do not stand as an
impediment to the Curlender decision. Rather, the Curlender
court was correct when, in framing the question before it, it
stated, "The appeal presents an issue of first impression in California .... "88
Turpin also implied that the mere existence of adverse precedent in other states stood as a barrier to the Curlender decision. 87 However, Rodriguez had rejected any such idea. It aprecognizable at law because a necessary element for the establishment of any cause of action in tort is missing, injury and
damages consequential to that injury. A child born with severe
impairment, however, presents an entirely different situation
because the necessary element of injury is present."
106 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. 486 (emphasis in original). The dissent in Turpin
also distinguished Stills: "[TJhe case is dissimilar from the instant case. In Stills the
child 'was and is a healthy, happy youngster who is a joy to his mother.' His only disability was illegitimacy. In view of social mores as they existed in the 1970's, any damages
would be highly speculative." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citation
omitted).
84. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
85. The independence of the appel1ate districts was i\lustrated when the Turpin
court, from the Fifth District, refused to fol1ow the Second District's Curlender decision.
86. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
87. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 692, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The Turpin court stated that
until Curlender, "a long and unbroken line of authority, both in and outside of California, has held that a cause of action for 'wrongful life' could not be stated." rd.
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provingly quoted a Massachusetts court that had observed, "We
should be mindful of the trend although our decision is not
reached by a process of following the crowd. "al In this case the
Curlender court sought to lead the crowd, to show the way to a
more just tort system; one that other courts had not reached due
to mixed or muddled reasoning.
B.

DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE

The role of the legislature was the second major area where
Turpin and Cur lender clashed. The Turpin court rejected
"Curlender as unsound under established principles of law and
as a sortie into areas of public policy clearly within the competence of the Legislature."all But Rodriguez had shown that the
deference-to-the-Iegislature argument had not been persuasive
when the question involved judicial development of judiciallycreated common law:
The second principal rationale of the Deshotel
opinion . . . was that any departure from the
then-settled rule denying the wife recovery for the
loss of consortium "should be left to the legislative action," and defendants in the case at bar
echo that plea. But in the years since Deshotel
the argument has fared badly in our decisions. 'In
effect the contention is a request that courts abdicate their responsibility for the upkeep of the
common law. That upkeep it needs continuously,
as this case demonstrates.'"

In this regard, Curlender cited Rodriguez for the proposition that California courts have power to develop flexible, judicially created tort common law:
It is to the credit of this state that our highest
court has, when expansion of tort liability is indi88. 12 Cal. 3d at 392, 525 P.2d at 675, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 771. See Diu v. Lilly & Co.,
364 Maaa. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555, 661 (1973). The diaaent in Thrpin atated, "Although
deference should be accorded decisions of other jurisdictions, they should be followed
only if consonant with California law." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 698, 174 Cal. Rptr. 133.
89. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 692-93,174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The Turpin court argued that,
"[ilf any decision requires the wise deliberation and painstaking inVestigation that only
the Legislature can give, the determination that impaired, but living children should be
enabled to sue for the injury of birth is auch a decision. Accordingly, the iaaue here could
better be left to legislative determination." [d. at 698, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
90. 12 Cal. 3d at 393, 525 P.2d at 675-76,115 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72 (quoting People v.
Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1964».
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cated, emphasized the flexible nature of judicially
created common law and the assistance provided
by analysis of previous decisions whether of California courts or courts in other jurisdictions in defining the issues, identifying trends and, on occasion, detecting the winds of change.'1
91. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (citation omitted). At one point
the Cur lender court suggested that, in an appropriate case, the child may have a cause of
action against her parents for wrongful life:
The "wrongful life" cause of action with which we are concerned is based upon negligently caused failure by someone
under a duty to do 80 to inform the prospective parents of
facts needed by them to make a conscious choice not to become parents. If a case arose where, despite due care by the
medical profession in transmitting the necessary warnings,
parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a pregnancy,
with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be
born, that conscious choice would provide an intervening act
of proximate cause to preclude liability insofar as defendants
otller than the parents were concerned. Under such circumstances, we see no sound public policy which should protect
those parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering
and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring.
Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (emphasis in original). The Turpin Court recoiled from
this vision of a child suing her parents for the pain and suffering of her genetic defects.
"The right of parents to make a decision to take the risk of having offspring with a
defective rather than live childle8B, for example, should not be tampered with by judicial
intermeddeling." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
The Legislature agreed that a child's cause of action for wrongful life should not
extend to suits against tile parents. As originally introduced by ABBemblyman McAlister,
A.B. 267 would have totally rejected the Curlender holding:
A court of appeals has recently held tIlat a child amicted with
a genetic disorder has a cause of action for damages based on
. her birth with such defects proximately caused by the negligent failure by a laboratory that conducted genetic tests on
the child's parents to inform the parents that they were carriers of the genetic disorder. This bill would provide that no
cause of action arises (1) on behalf of any person based upon
the claim that the person should not have been conceived or,
if conceived, should not have been born alive, or (2) on behalf
of a person based on the claim that another person, once conceived, should not have been allowed to have beem born alive.
It also would provide that the failure or refusal of a person to
. prevent the live birtll of another person once conceived shall
not be a defense in any action against a third party, and would
prohibit such failure or refusal from being considered in
awarding damages.
. . . Section 43.6 is added to the Civil Code, to read: 43.6.
(a) No cause of action arises on behalf of any person based
upon the claim that the person should not have been conceived, or if conceived, should not have been born alive.
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In sum, Rodriguez sets forth two guidelines for a court when developing a new tort rule. First, if there is California precedent,
look for a dramatic shift of opinion in other jurisdictions. Second, if there is no California precedent, look to other jurisdictions to detect the winds of change.
The Curlender court found no California precedent contrary to its holding, but instead detected shifting winds in the
dissents in cases from other jurisdictions, the views of commentators, the intermediate appellate decisions of Park v. Chessin,
the implications of Roe v. Wade, the continuing recognition by
other courts of the parents' cause of action, the retreat from accepting the "impossibility of measuring damages" as a ground
for denying the child's cause of action, and the "dramatic increase in the lI;u~t few decades, of the medical knowledge and
skill needed to avoid genetic disaster. "til
(b) No cause of action arises on behalf of a person based
on the claim that another person, once conceived, should not
have been allowed to have been born alive.
(c) The failure or refusal of a person to prevent the live
birth of another person once conceived shall not be a defense
in any action against a third party, nor shall 8uch failure or
refUBal be considered in awarding damages in any 8uch action.
(d) As UBed in this section "conception" means the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm."
A.B. 267, 1981-82 Sess. (Cal. 1981).
Thia language in the bill ran into opposition in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
The amended bill, ultimately paBBed by both the Assembly and Senate and signed by the
Governor three months after the Turpin deciaion, only rejected any cause of action for
wrongful life by a child against her parents. Significantly, subsection (b) strengthens the
child's cause of action against medical personnel. When medical personnel are negligent
in testing and a child is conceived, but it ia diacovered prior to birth that the child bas
the feared genetic defects, the medical personnel cannot argue that the parents' refusal
to obtain an abortion is an intervening act that relieves them of liability.
A.B. 267, as amended, added § 43.6 to the Civil Code. That section reads:
(a) No cause of action ariaes against a parent of a child
based upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived, or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have
been born alive.
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live
birth of hia or her child shall not be a defense in any action
against a third party, nor shall the failure or refUBal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.
(c) As used in thia section "conceived" means the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm.
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 331, § 1 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West Supp. 1981».
92. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
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OF LIFE

Though the Curlender court found that it was neither
bound by decisions from other jurisdictions, nor restrained by
legislative inaction, it did seek to develop a theory of recovery
that addressed the main concerns expressed by other courts:
that a value would have to be assigned to life itself, and that a
consequent denigration of life would be necessary to find that
the child was suffering legal damages. Prior courts believed that
the wrongful life cause of action was tantamount to the idea that
a genetically-defective child was better off dead, or at least never
born.
In response to this concern the Curlender court stated:
The circumstance that the birth and injury have
come in hand in hand has caused other courts to
deal with the problem by barring recovery. The
reality of the "wrongful life" concept is that such
a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just
to retreat into meditation on the mysteries of life.
We need not be concerned with the fact that had
defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might
not have come into existence at all. The certainty
of genetic impairment is no longer a mystery. In
addition, a reverent appreciation of life compels
recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she
may be, has come into existence as a living person
with certain rights."

The Turpin court replied that, U[b]y such a narrow, humanistic approach to an issue laden, as it is, with questions and considerations beyond the judicial ken, Curlender represents at
least an unwise jurisprudential example which we decline to follow."9. On this point, the Turpin court misperceived Curlender.
In the above quoted section, the Curlender court recognized that
the defendant's negligence had produced two distinct elements:
(1) the child is given life and (2) the child lives with pain and
suffering. 911 Prior decisions had not made this theoretical distinc93. ld. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
94. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
95. lOS Cal. App. 3d at 821, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The Curlender court noted that:
The dissenting opinion in Berman expressed the cogent observation that, as for the child, "[aJn adequate comprehension of
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tion between life, and pain and suffering, and neither did Turpin. The significance of this distinction will be shown later.
The Turpin court, misreading Curlender, searched for the
basis of Curlender's holding in prior case law and in the Turpin
child's complaint. In doing so, Turpin interpreted the Curlender
holding as grounded upon the fundamental right of a child to be
born as a whole, functional human being." However, Curlender
explicitly noted both that this fundamental right argument had
been advanced in the intermediate appellate decision of Park v.
Chessin 97 and that the New York Court of Appeals had rejected
it. 98 Cur lender did not thereafter mention any such right in developing its analysis, and none was necessary to its holding. Turpin, nonetheless resurrected the old arguments on the rejection
of any such right, the preciousness of life in any form, and the
refusal to attach a value to either life or to nonexistence. Again,
the Turpin court attacked Cur lender for not addressing the
problem that all previous courts had faced-attaching a value to
life: "Curlender avoids resolving this fundamental problem of
measuring damages, that is, comparing the value of impaired life
against no life.""
the infant's claims under these circumstances starts with the
realization that the infant has come into this world and is
here, encumbered by an injury attributable to the malpractice
of the doctors."
Id. (quoting Bennan v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 19 (1979) (emphasis in original).
For a discussion of Berman, see notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
96. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The Turpin court stated:
Turning to the issue of public policy, it is explicit that the
minor plaintiff herein predicated her right to recover upon an
alleged right to be born as a whole, functional human being
without defect, alleging specifically she was "deprived of the
fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional
human being without total deafness, all to her general damages." Cur lender is implicitly grounded upon the same
concept.
Id.
97. For a discussion of Park v. Chessin, see notes 33-37 supra and accompanying
text.
98. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 822,165 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Referring to the New York Court
of Appeals, the Curlender court stated, "The court particularly rejected the idea that a
child may expect life without deformity: 'There is no precedent for recognition at the
Appellate Division of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional
human being.''' Id. (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900, 386 N.E.2d 807,
812 (1978».
99. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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While Curlender, did avoid valuing life, it did not shrink
from measuring damages. As noted earlier, Cur lender made the
unique distinction between the two simultaneously occuring, but
theoretically distinct, elements the defendant's negligence had
produced: the child is given life and the child experiences pain
and suffering. Therefrom, Cur lender held that the child could
recover for the detriment received-the pain and suffering-but
that this injury was only to be measured by the actual life span
of the child plaintiff, not by any theoretical life span of a child
without the physical defects. loo In this way, the court again negated the idea that it based its decision on a fundamental right
to be born whole. If such a right were being recognized, the correct measure of damages would have reflected the normal life
span of a whole child.
By narrowing the recoverable damages to the pain and suffering of the actual child, the court did not have to value either
life or nonexistence. What Curlender did not explain was what
happened to the benefit of life received by the child. If damages
are assessable for the burden of pain and suffering, for example,
why shouldn't the benefit of the life received be a component in
the calculation? After all, this benefit also resulted from the defendant's negligence. In this respect Curlender provides little assistance. It may be that the Curlender court realized that valuing life is a volatile issue, found it unnecessary to its holding,
100. The Curlender court stated:
The complaint seeks damages based upon an acturial life expectancy of plaintiff of more than 70 years-the life expectancy if plaintiff had been bom without the Tay-Sachs disease. The complaint sets forth that plaintiff's actual life
expectancy, because of the disease, is only four years. We reo
ject as untenable the claim that plaintiff is entitled to damages as if plaintiff has been bom without defects and would
have had a normal life expectancy. Plaintiff's right to damages
must be considered on the basis of plaintiff's mental and physical condition at birth and her expected condition during the
short life span (four years according to the complaint) antici.
pated for one with her impaired condition. In similar fashion,
we reject the notion that a "wrongful-life" cause of action involves any attempted evaluation of a claimed right not to be
bom. In essence, we construe the "wrongful·life" cause of action by the defective child as the right of such child to recover
damages for the pain and suffering to be endured during the
limited life span available to such a child and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition.
106 Cal. App. 3d at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (emphasis in original).
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and therefore refused to discuss either the value of life or the
relation of that benefit to the question of damages. Neither
wanting nor required to make any valuation of life, the court
ignored the benefit received.
IV. ANALYSIS

As shown earlier, Turpin misperceived the Curlender analysis and thereby failed to address Curlender's unique approach.
Curlender's theoretical distinction between the life received and
the pain and suffering endured by the child, along with the
court's assessment of damages, goes far to justify a cause of action for the child. However, this analysis was not fully developed. Since the child is suing only for pain and suffering, not
life, the question arises whether the defendant can raise the
value of the benefit received (life) in mitigation of damages.
Case law provides three ways to deal with the benefit of life in
wrongful life cases.
A.

INFRINGEMENT ON THE PARENTS' RIGHT

To

CHOOSE

As noted earlier,lOl Restatement section 920 applies in California. According to section 920:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has
caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to
the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable. lot

Thus, section 920 allows the benefit to be raised in mitigation of damages where it is equitable. In a wrongful life case, it
would not be equitable to allow the defendant to raise the benefit in mitigation of damages. The defendant never had the intention of conferring his benefit on the child-plaintiff, but, more
importantly, the defendant had no right to make such a
decision.
In Bushman v. Burns Medical Center,1°' the plaintiff un101. The applicability of the Restatement's benefit rule is discussed at notes 65-67
lIupra and accompanying text.

102. REsTATEMENT (SBCOND) or TORTS § 90 (1979).
103. 83 Mich. App. 463. 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978).
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derwent a vasectomy at the defendant hospital. His wife later
became pregnant and delivered their fifth child. The parents
sued the medical center for malpractice, claiming mental and
emotional suffering and the cost of pregnancy. The trial court
accepted the defense theory that "any damages incurred by the
plaintiffs should be offset by the benefits received from having
the blessing of a healthy child. "104 A verdict for the defense was
returned. On appeal it was reversed and remanded due to this
erroneous jury instruction.
Referring to Restatement section 920, the Bushman court
stated:
We believe the last phrase of the quote from the
Restatement is applicable here. To allow the defense to shield itself behind the love and affection
of the plaintiffs for their healthy and lovable fifth
child is less than equitable if indeed the plaintiffs'
claims are in fact true. That is, that the physician
was negligent, that the plaintiff mother, a polio
victim as a child, had considerable and extreme
difficulty with four previous deliveries, that she
had a crippling condition of the spine, a significant difference in leg length, a distorted pelvis
and had been subjected to extensive labor anywhere from 45 to 50 hours during delivery. Testimony indicates that plaintiff mother was placed
under psychiatric care, threatening suicide shortly
after her pregnancy was confirmed. Under these
circumstances the damages claimed seem reasonably and equitably severable. 1011

In a wrongful life case, a jury could not be expected to value
a child's life at less than the pain and suffering of some genetic
defects. Furthermore, it is not equitable to allow the benefits
rule in wrongful life cases because the defendants have infringed
on the parents' right to choose whether this child should be conceived, or, if conceived, born. An early commentator stated, "[i]f
the infant is to endure a life with defects, it must be because
that was the moral choice made by his parents and not because
they were given no alternative choice due to the negligence or
104. Id. at 457, 268 N.W.2d at 685.
105. Id. at 463-64, 268 N.W.2d at 687-88.
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private morality of a physician. "108
B.

ABSENCE OF BENEFIT TO THE BURDENED INTEREST

As discussed previously,lO'1 the Custodio court, in applying
section 920 in California, noted that it applies only when the
defendant benefits the interest to be protected. In a wrongful
life case the parents have sought to protect the infant from enduring the pain and suffering caused by genetic defects. The life
given to the infant brings all the benefits noted by the courts
and the child is able to experience many rewards of this earthly
existence. However, none of these benefits reduces the pain and
suffering of the infant, although it may receive other benefits.
The joy and affection lavished on a child by family and friends
is a rewarding experience. But these benefits cannot reduce
Shauna Curlender's partial or complete loss of vision, her mental
underdevelopment, the softness of her muscles, the convulsions,
or all the pain and suffering attendant thereto. Neither can they
bring hearing to Joy Turpin. The life given, far from being a
benefit to these interests to be protected, is the foundation on
which they rest. The life given supports and nurtures, but does
not mitigate or reduce, the physical· defects, the very things that
the parents, in soliciting medical advice from the defendants,
sought to avoid for their child.

C.

BALANCING OF LIFE AGAINST NONLIFE

Courts could allow the jury to balance the benefit against
the burden, rather than making the irrebuttable presumption
that life is always superior to nonlife. In Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic lO8 the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the parents'
cause of action for "wrongful conception" due to a negligently
performed sterilization operation, and allowed damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering during delivery, and loss of
consortium. Also, parents could recover the costs of rearing the
child, offset by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and society
during the parent's life expectancy.loe Sherlock allowed the
value of the child's life in relation to the parents to be used in
106. Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": A SUUeated Analysis, 55 MINN.
L. REv. 58, 81 (1980).
107. Custodio u. Bauer is discussed at notes 66-67 lJupra and accompanying text.
108. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. S. Ct. 1977).
109. 1d. at 170-71.
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mitigation of damages. Likewise, the courts could allow the
value of the child's life to be applied in mitigation of her own
damages in a wrongful life case. However, this would entail a
valuation of life, the very thing that most courts have refused to
do.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts in other jurisdictions have found various reasons to
deny the child's wrongful life action. Central to all their holdings, however, was the belief that a valuation of life itself was
necessary to identify the plaintiff's injury and to assess the damages. This was not the case in Curlender. Curlender recognized
the child's cause of action without undergoing a valuation of life.
Turpin misperceived the Curlender court's analysis and thus
failed to adequately refute its arguments. The Curlender court's
analysis, including its discussion of damage assessment, coupled
with the equitable considerations of Restatement section 920,
provides a solid theoretical foundation for the recognition of a
child's cause of action for wrongful life when the pain and suffering from genetic defects are made manifest by medical
malpractice. •
Daniel Linchey

• Editor's Note. During publication, the California Supreme Court reversed Tupin
v. Sortini (May 3, 1982) (No. S.F. 24319). In a 4-2 decision, the court recognized the
child-plaintifl"s cause of action for wrongful life, but limited recovery to special damages
such as medical expenses and specialized training. General damages were denied because
of the inability of comparing the value of an impaired life to nonlife in any fair, nonspeculative manner. The benefit rule of section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts was likewise rejected because it would directly require the weighing of life vs. nonlife. Special damages were allowed since they are certain and readily measurable and in
many instances the expenses would be vital "not only to the child's well-being but to his
or her very survival." [d. at 19.
The dissent found the majority's opinion internally inconsistent in allowing special
damages but not general damages for the same tort, and would have adopted Curlender's
approach to awarding general damages.
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